Why Pakistan's Nuclear Program is Worse Than You Thought?

Pakistan's nuclear command and control?

The evolution of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system has been significantly shaped by a complex interplay of both internal and external factors. While Pakistan has consistently improved its nuclear security infrastructure, global attention and internal political dynamics have continuously influenced its approach.

Internal Factors Driving Evolution:

Military Dominance and Civilian Oversight:

From its inception, Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was largely the "sole preserve of the army," with civilian leadership often having limited knowledge about critical aspects of nuclear policy. Instances like Benazir Bhutto learning more from the CIA than her own military underscore this historical imbalance.

The deposition of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif by Pervez Musharraf further dispelled notions of significant civilian control. Pakistan's political landscape, characterized by "disorderly transfer of power" and four coups in 60 years, has had serious implications for the viability of any nuclear chain of command.

Formalization of Command Structure:

>The need for a more structured administrative authority became evident after Pakistan's publicly announced atomic tests in May 1998. In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated moves to establish a National Command Authority (NCA) to manage the arsenal and a nuclear regulatory authority to prevent technology export, though he was ousted before full implementation.

The NCA was formally established on February 2, 2000, as the highest decision-making body, following approval by the National Security Council and development of a unified central command system by General Pervez Musharraf in April 1999. The NCA's secretariat, the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), was also created in 1998 and became operational in 2001, responsible for day-to-day management and security.

Shifting Power Dynamics:

While Pervez Musharraf served as the NCA's first chairman as President, a new law passed in 2008 unanimously by the Pakistani Parliament placed the NCA directly under the Prime Minister's authority.

This indicates a shift to ensure the Prime Minister, as Chief Executive, chairs the NCA, which includes senior civilian and military leaders. Although the military maintains operational control, the government now has a greater say in the nuclear weapons program.

Concerns over Internal Stability and Extremism:

Persistent concerns exist regarding internal stability, including the potential for "fissures" within the Pakistan Army that could impact command and control or the custody of nuclear weapons.

There are fears that fundamentalist forces, both within and outside the military, could potentially gain control and even engage in proliferation for religious reasons, viewing Pakistan's arsenal as the "Islamic Bomb".

However, sources indicate that these scenarios are considered unlikely given the sophistication of the system, the military's motivation to safeguard the weapons (seeing them as a source of influence), the requirement of consensus for a launch decision, and existing contingency plans for the assassination or elimination of key leaders.

External Factors Influencing Evolution:

International Scrutiny and Pressure: 

Major international developments, such as the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the A. Q. Khan proliferation scandal (2003-2004), and ongoing instability in Pakistan, have fueled international concerns that Pakistan's nuclear weapons could be compromised.

Regarding Pakistan's nuclear security?

International perceptions and primary concerns regarding Pakistan's nuclear security have garnered significant global attention.

These concerns range from potential "doomsday scenarios" to more nuanced considerations of Pakistan's evolving security infrastructure. Here are the primary concerns and international perceptions:

Primary Concerns Regarding Pakistan's Nuclear Security

Potential Theft or Unauthorized Use

Global concerns include the potential theft of nuclear weapons or materials and the unauthorized use of a nuclear device. These risks are considered unlikely due to the sophistication of Pakistan's nuclear command and control system, but they remain a focus of international attention.

Terrorist Groups Taking Control of the Government or Military

A major scenario involves the possibility of terrorist groups gaining control of the Pakistani government. There are concerns that conservative Islamic political forces could hijack the government through elections or manipulation, or increase their influence over the military, thereby gaining access to nuclear weapons or materials.

Disorderly Transfer of Power and Political Instability

Pakistan's political history, characterized by "disorderly transfer of power" and four coups in 60 years, raises serious doubts about civilian authority's control over the nuclear chain of command. The nuclear weapons program has historically been the "sole preserve of the army".

For instance, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto reportedly learned more about Pakistan's nuclear program from the CIA than her own army. This instability could impact the command and control structure and the custody of nuclear weapons.

Proliferation Risks

If fundamentalist elements within or outside the army were to gain control, they are believed to be "quite capable of proliferation for the cause of Ummah". The 2003/2004 A. Q. Khan scandal, which involved a major nuclear proliferation network, significantly heightened international concerns regarding Pakistan's control over its nuclear assets.

Internal Fissures within the Army

Concerns exist about "fissures" within the Pakistan Army, which, if they degenerate into violent rivalry, could potentially impact the command and control structure and the very custody of nuclear weapons.

Assassination or Elimination of Key Leaders

Fears exist that extremist Islamic elements could assassinate or eliminate key individuals in the command and control system, potentially creating a dangerous vacuum and making nuclear weapons vulnerable.

While such attacks have occurred against high-profile figures, the likelihood of this scenario leading to unauthorized access or use is considered low due to contingency plans and the need for simultaneous elimination of several individuals.

Development of Long-Range Missile Capabilities

More recently, Pakistan's expansion of its long-range ballistic missile capabilities, including those potentially capable of reaching the US homeland, has been labeled an "emerging threat" by US officials. This development has led to sanctions and increased diplomatic pressure.

International Perceptions:

Skepticism and Heightened Concern:

The international community, particularly the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), maintains a strong interest and often skepticism regarding Pakistan's nuclear security.

Events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the A.Q. Khan scandal, and domestic instability have intensified these concerns, creating a "perception of weakness" in the nation's command and control system. The head of the IAEA, Mohammad ElBaradei, notably expressed concerns in 2008 that Pakistan's nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of extremist groups.

Unsubstantiated Claims of US ControlThere have been controversial claims, such as those made by former CIA officer John Kiriakou, alleging that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is effectively under the command of an American general.

Kiriakou suggests this arrangement was made by the Pakistani government and has reduced the nuclear threat in South Asia, influencing India's de-escalation. However, these claims are largely unverified and highly controversial, lacking official or independent corroboration, and are often viewed with skepticism due to Kiriakou's background.

US Contingency Plans ("Snatch-and-Grab") While the US does not have direct control over Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, it has reportedly developed highly classified "snatch-and-grab" contingency plans to secure Pakistan's nuclear weapons in worst-case scenarios, such as internal chaos, terrorist threats, or an extremist takeover. These plans are widely reported but there is no public evidence of their activation or of US personnel having real-time operational authority.

Pakistan's Official Stance and Perceived Improvements Pakistan officially asserts that its nuclear weapons are under its exclusive control, managed by its own military and civilian leadership through a "technically sound and foolproof command and control system".

Since 1998, Pakistan has significantly improved its nuclear security infrastructure, establishing a comprehensive legislative and institutional structure, nuclear security systems, and undertaking international obligations.

These improvements, including the establishment of the National Command Authority (NCA) and Strategic Plans Division (SPD), and the implementation of a "two and/or three-man rule" for authorization, have considerably reduced the risk of unauthorized access or use. Senior US military officials have previously expressed satisfaction with the security of Pakistan's weapons.

Call for Transparency Despite reported improvements, international confidence often hinges on Pakistan adopting a more transparent approach and learning from international best practices. Pakistani officials have started briefing diplomats, academics, and journalists to explain their "foolproof" system.

Consequences of Negative Perceptions A failure to combat negative perceptions can have wide-ranging implications for Pakistan, including undermining dialogue with India, increasing international pressure, slowing foreign investment, and hindering its ability to access civilian nuclear technology needed to address its power crisis.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Status Pakistan is not a party to the NPT and views the treaty as discriminatory, stating it will only join as a recognized nuclear-weapon state.

Its past proliferation track record, particularly through the A.Q. Khan network, has made other countries, including the US, rebuff its efforts to obtain nuclear export deals similar to India's. China's civil nuclear agreement with Pakistan in 2010 was criticized for potentially weakening the NPT by facilitating nuclear programs in non-NPT states.