China's Nuclear Surge
Global Stability and the Shadow of a New Arms Race
The global power dynamic is undergoing a significant transformation, largely driven by China's rapid nuclear modernization within a broader strategic rivalry. This unprecedented build-up can be compared to historical arms races but introduces new challenges and risks to international security.
China is engaged in one of the largest and most rapid nuclear modernization campaigns among the nine nuclear-armed states, reshaping the global nuclear landscape and prompting urgent questions about its strategic intentions.
The Unprecedented Scale of China's Nuclear Expansion
China's nuclear arsenal is growing at an alarming rate, moving away from its historical "minimum deterrent" policy. As of January 2023, China possessed an estimated 410 nuclear warheads, up by 60 from the previous year. By mid-2024, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimated roughly 500 nuclear warheads, with 440 available for delivery.
The U.S. Department of Defense projects this could reach 1,000 warheads by 2030 and 1,500 by 2035. FAS considers this growth trajectory feasible, though dependent on several uncertain factors.
Beyond numbers, China is enhancing all three legs of its nuclear triad—land-based, sea-based, and air-based delivery systems.
Land-based Systems
Historically, China's nuclear deterrent centered on land-based ballistic missiles. Its Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers now exceed 450, with 142 operational as of January 2023.
China deploys both road-mobile ICBMs, such as the DF-31A/AG, and silo-based missiles. The DF-31A entered service in 2007 with a range of 11,200 km, while the DF-31AG, revealed in 2017, offers improved off-road capability.
China has approximately 350 new silos under construction across three northern desert regions, likely completed by 2023. This silo expansion is the main driver of the 2023 warhead estimate increase. The final warhead total will depend on whether each silo is filled, multiple-warhead equipped, or used in a "shell game" strategy.
The DF-41, operational since 2020, is road- and rail-mobile with a 12,000–15,000 km range, making it one of the world's longest-range missiles. The DoD assesses it likely carries no more than three multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) per missile.
China is also developing advanced systems like a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), tested in 2021.
This allows extended orbital presence, unpredictable de-orbit timing, and potential evasion of missile defenses. The DF-17, fielded in 2020, features a hypersonic glide vehicle, primarily for conventional missions but with possible nuclear roles.
Sea-based Systems
China's sea-based nuclear capability emerged in 2015 with the JL-2 SLBM. It operates six Type 094 (Jin class) nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), now upgraded with JL-3 SLBMs with 10,000+ km range and multiple warheads, enabling strikes on parts of the continental U.S. from China's coastal waters.
A next-generation SSBN, the Type 096, is under construction, expected to be larger, quieter, and possibly equipped with MIRVed SLBMs in 24 launch tubes by the late 2020s or early 2030s.
Air-Based Systems
The air leg of China's nuclear forces has historically been secondary. The H-6 bombers, including the H-6N, are now fully operational for nuclear delivery. The H-6N, with in-air refueling, was fielded in 2020, completing China's nuclear triad.
China is developing its first long-range stealth bomber, the H-20, with a range exceeding 10,000 km, and air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs). The H-20 is expected to be operational in the 2030s.
The Shifting Nuclear Doctrine
Beyond "No First Use"?
China has historically maintained a "self-defensive nuclear strategy" with an unconditional "no first use" (NFU) policy since 1964, pledging to only employ nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack by another country.
Traditionally, China stored its warheads separately from missiles, indicating a low alert level posture aimed at assured retaliation rather than pre-emption.
However, China's rapid nuclear modernization and shifting posture under President Xi Jinping have brought the credibility of this long-held NFU doctrine into question.
Shift Towards "Launch on Warning" (LOW)
The 2022 DoD report assessed that the PLA is implementing a "launch on warning" (LOW) posture, or "early warning counter-strike" (Chinese version: 预警反击).
This means Beijing would initiate a counter-strike upon receiving a launch warning, before its own targets are hit.
This move is indicative of a "more offensive nuclear force posture" and has significant implications for its NFU policy, as it would mean "initiating a Chinese nuclear counter-strike against an opponent before China itself is struck".
Military exercises reportedly involve LOW response, which would necessitate storing warheads and missiles together. China's development of early-warning satellites, possibly aided by Russia, supports this capability.
Lowering the Nuclear Threshold
Chinese strategic writings, such as the 1994 PLA document The Science of Second Artillery Operations, reportedly signal Beijing's willingness to "lower the nuclear threshold" and "actively carry out strong, forceful nuclear coercion" even in response to conventional attacks by a strong adversary.
Dr. Christopher Ford notes that if a nation is willing to use nuclear weapons in response to a purely conventional attack, it "certainly doesn’t have a 'no first use' nuclear policy". The U.S. Department of State described China's NFU policy as "ambiguous" in June 2024.
Comparison with Other NFU Policies
India
India also has a formal NFU policy adopted in 1998, asserting nuclear weapons are for deterrence only and pursuing "retaliation only". However, New Delhi conditions its pledge, retaining the option for a nuclear first strike "in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons".
Russia
The Soviet Union adopted a formal NFU policy in 1982, but the Russian Federation formally reversed this in 1993, citing the weakness of its armed forces in the post-Soviet era. Russia's current policy allows for the use of nuclear weapons in response to a large-scale conventional aggression when the very existence of the state is threatened. Russia and China do maintain a mutual agreement on no first use against each other, developed under the 2001 Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation.
United States
The U.S. has refused to adopt an NFU policy, reserving the right to use nuclear weapons first in conflict, partly to provide a nuclear umbrella over its allies. Its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, with assurances not to use or threaten nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states party to the NPT and in compliance with non-proliferation obligations.
United Kingdom
The UK does not have a 'first use' or 'no first use' policy, keeping its adversaries uncertain. UK officials have stated readiness to use nuclear weapons in a "pre-emptive initial strike" in "the most extreme circumstances".
Pakistan
Pakistan refuses to adopt an NFU doctrine, indicating it would launch nuclear weapons even if the other side did not use them first, a policy it defends as deterrent in nature.
North Korea
North Korea has publicly pledged that nuclear weapons "will never be abused or used as a means for preemptive strike," but also states it may use its "most powerful offensive strength in advance to punish them" if there is an "attempt to have recourse to military force against us".
Israel
Israel maintains nuclear ambiguity but is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons. Some speculate it has a "Samson Option" of massive nuclear retaliation if its existence is threatened.
Impact on Decision-Making Timelines
Emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), are noted to lead to shrinking decision-making timelines. China's development of advanced delivery systems like FOBS with HGVs, which can vary de-orbiting timing and have unpredictable flight paths, aims to evade missile defenses and could effectively compress an adversary's decision-making window for response.
This capability, combined with a potential LOW posture, indicates a more compressed decision-making process for China's nuclear forces as well.
These enhanced capabilities, particularly the move towards a LOW posture and the development of advanced, hard-to-intercept systems, suggest that China's NFU doctrine may be losing credibility in practice, raising concerns among observers about its true intentions and the increased risk of nuclear escalation.
Drivers and Potential Limitations of China's Nuclear Build-Up
Several factors are believed to drive this significant expansion:
Great Power Status
Beijing may seek to achieve approximate nuclear parity with the United States and Russia to bolster its international standing and attain great power status on the international stage.
This rationale has implications for future strategic arms control agreements, as Beijing has previously balked at talks citing its smaller forces, but might be open to them if it reaches parity.
Evolving Threat Landscape
China perceives its nuclear deterrent to be challenged by the evolving nuclear and missile defense capabilities of other countries, particularly the U.S..
U.S. ballistic missile defense programs, such as the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems, are seen by Beijing as eroding its strategic deterrent by diminishing its ability to deliver a retaliatory nuclear attack.
To counter these, China is MIRVing more of its warheads and employing penetration aids like decoys and chaff to boost their offensive capabilities. MIRVs are significantly harder to defend against than single warheads as they require missile defense systems to destroy multiple targets simultaneously.
Regional Leverage
Chinese leaders may be reconceptualizing how to use nuclear weapons in a crisis, especially given heightened tensions over Taiwan. Strengthening nuclear capabilities could provide additional political and military leverage in a conventional conflict over the island.
Reduced Relative Threat Perception (Paradoxical Driver)
Paradoxically, China's nuclear build-up is occurring at a time when its conventional forces are arguably more powerful relative to any conceivable external power than at any point since the Qianlong Emperor's reign.
Moreover, thanks to decades of post-Cold War nuclear reductions by the U.S. and Russia, the specific nuclear threats China faces are relatively low. The ratio of Chinese to non-Chinese nuclear weapons has never been higher, even before the current build-up.
Despite its rapid growth, China's nuclear build-up faces potential limitations:
Fissile Material Reserves
A primary limitation is China's relatively small reserve of weapons-grade fissile material, which would need to be expanded to support more than 1,000 warheads.
The International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated in 2021 that China's fissile material stockpile was sufficient for only a few hundred warheads, paling in comparison to U.S. and Russian reserves.
There is evidence that China is pursuing additional fissile material production by constructing fast breeder reactors and reprocessing facilities.
The DoD views this with concern, stating China has described them as a "national defense investment project," and there are concerns about Russia assisting China with producing highly enriched uranium (HEU) in these reactors.
Corruption
There are widespread but unsubstantiated reports of corruption and quality issues within China's military procurement program, such as missiles being filled with water instead of fuel or missile silos suffering from other quality issues.
While the veracity of these reports is unclear, they highlight how uncertainty can arise around capabilities and could potentially affect the reliability and accuracy of projections about China's missile force.
The "Great Power Competition"
Framework and Broader Implications
The current missile threat from China is understood within a broader framework of "great-power rivalries" and regional instability.
Escalation Risks in Regional Conflicts
Experts suggest the most likely scenario for nuclear war is not a sudden preemptive strike, but rather escalation from a conventional conflict involving nuclear-armed powers. Dr. Christopher Ford points to China's "19th-Century-style games of regional military aggression, intimidation, and territorial expansion" as creating the greatest risk. This includes:
Expanding into and militarizing areas claimed by other countries in the South China Sea. Gradually expanding territory in the Himalayas.
Preparing for a potential invasion of Taiwan. These actions are identified as creating the greatest risk of multi-party conventional war in the region, and thus the greatest risk of nuclear escalation with the United States.
The ambiguous nature and rapid strike capability of China's advanced delivery systems, such as the DF-17 equipped with an HGV and the FOBS carrying a nuclear-capable HGV, contribute to this risk. Their ability to maneuver at hypersonic speeds and vary de-orbiting timing could make Chinese warheads easier to evade missile defenses, effectively shortening decision-making timelines.
There is a general trend of "conventional-nuclear integration" which can muddy the line between potential conventional and nuclear use, contributing to destabilization. China's increasing willingness to lower its nuclear threshold in response to conventional attacks also contributes to this blurring.
Beijing's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal and doctrine makes it "impossible to fully understand Beijing’s motives or to accurately grasp the exact nature of China’s evolving capabilities," contributing to ambiguity and uncertainty about its intentions in a conflict.
Impact on US and Allied Deterrence Strategies
China's rapid nuclear expansion and qualitative improvements pose significant challenges to U.S. and allied deterrence strategies.
China's nuclear build-up is increasingly presenting the United States and the Russian Federation with an "historically unprecedented 'two-peer problem'" — the challenge of posturing for deterrence against two nuclear-armed great power challenges simultaneously. This situation directly increases nuclear risks and pressures both Washington and Moscow to further build and deploy nuclear weaponry themselves. Dr. Ford notes this problem is most acute for Americans because Russia and China currently exhibit more antipathy towards the U.S. than towards each other.
China's more robust nuclear arsenal may paradoxically make the region "safer" for conventional war, potentially even protracted conventional conflict, by raising the stakes of intervention. China has deployed regional nuclear forces, such as the nuclear-capable DF-26 anti-ship ballistic missile and the hypersonic-capable DF-27, which are thought to provide "usable nuclear options on every run of the escalation ladder". This capability is aimed at bolstering China as a "world-class" military power by mid-century, preparing the PLA for "intelligentized, multi-domain counter-intervention warfare" against the United States.
Rising Doubts about Extended Deterrence
Allies, particularly in the Indo-Pacific like South Korea and Japan, express concerns about the credibility of America's "nuclear umbrella" or extended deterrence. This anxiety is fueled by multiplying threats and perceived distrust, leading to discussions about independent nuclear options. Historically, U.S. military strength and alliances served as powerful nonproliferation tools, obviating the perceived need for allies like Taiwan (in the late 1980s) and South Korea (in the 1970s) to develop their own nuclear weapons. China's military expansionism and territorial ambitions are now creating increasing incentives for China's neighbors to develop their own nuclear weaponry.
For Example
For example, Japan possesses a substantial quantity of separated plutonium (44.5 tons total, 8.6 tons on Japanese territory, equivalent to over 975 bombs).
>South Korea has a sophisticated nuclear power industry that could potentially produce fissile material and has for years requested U.S. permission for reprocessing capabilities. Both countries are also developing advanced long-range missile capabilities. This raises concerns about a "proliferation moment" that strains the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.
U.S. Responses
The Biden administration directed the Pentagon to adapt and develop options for simultaneously deterring aggression by China, Russia, and North Korea. The U.S. is responding by modernizing its own nuclear triad, including upgrading F-35 aircraft, seeking new gravity bombs (B-61-13), and developing a new nuclear sub-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). The U.S. has also clarified that its nuclear weapons remain an option against both nuclear weapon use and potential non-nuclear strategic attacks.
Ripple Effect on Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Efforts Globally
The legal foundations of nuclear arms control are eroding, as seen with Russia's violations of the INF Treaty, revocation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and suspension of participation in the New START Treaty.
China has thus far rejected potential arms control talks with Washington, citing the much smaller size of its forces compared to the U.S. and Russia. The U.S. has called for trilateral arms control discussions involving China and Russia.
The overall context suggests that the risk of nuclear war is greater than at any time since the Cold War, exacerbated by geopolitical tensions and the modernization of nuclear arsenals. This makes discussions on nuclear risk reduction proposals increasingly relevant.
Asymmetric Threats
China's evolving nuclear posture is also influenced by other asymmetric threats.
Cyber Warfare:
Malign uses of disruptive technology (e.g., Stuxnet, Volt Typhoon campaigns) serve as case studies for future warfare, including gray-zone and hybrid operations.
These efforts could neutralize systems vital for the maintenance of deterrence of nuclear war, including early warning capabilities that detect and track advanced missile threats like hypersonics.
Space Weaponization:
China is rapidly developing capabilities that pose a direct threat to space assets. General Chance Saltzman highlighted China's rapidly developing ground-based laser threat that will soon be able to destroy U.S. satellites.
The ability to neutralize an opponent's "eyes and ears" – referring to critical surveillance and early warning satellites – could fundamentally disrupt deterrence.
Artificial Intelligence (AI):
Advances in AI and other leading-edge technologies raise concerns about shrinking decision-making timelines and the potential for these technologies to precipitate the breakdown of deterrence. While sources do not detail "AI-powered counter-hypersonics warheads" or specific "AI-powered counter-hypersonics programs," they discuss China's offensive HGVs and the broader impact of AI on strategic stability. Intelligence gathering and analysis on AI's military applications are crucial for understanding potential vulnerabilities and developing appropriate responses to manage rapid escalatory dynamics.
Economic Factors:
China's nuclear expansion involves significant investment. While the sources highlight the economic and industrial scale required for nuclear expansion, they do not directly discuss financial pressure or economic leverage as a form of strategic deterrence in the context of investment in advanced weapons like hypersonics.
Influence Operations and Disinformation:
The sources emphasize China's lack of transparency regarding its nuclear arsenal and doctrine, which creates ambiguity and challenges for external analysis.
This inherent opacity makes it "impossible to fully understand Beijing’s motives or to accurately grasp the exact nature of China’s evolving capabilities".
While there are unsubstantiated reports of corruption and quality issues within China's military, which could sow confusion about true capabilities, the sources do not provide specific examples or discussions of deliberate "influence operations and disinformation" campaigns launched by China to actively confuse adversaries about its advanced weapons programs.
Mitigating Risks: Paths Forward
Navigating the future in the context of China's advanced military technologies demands a multi-faceted approach involving strategic dialogues, technological innovation in defense, and robust international diplomacy.
Need for New Strategic Dialogues and Transparency Mechanisms with Beijing
Addressing Opacity
Beijing's lack of transparency makes it impossible to fully understand Beijing’s motives or to accurately grasp the exact nature of China’s evolving capabilities, necessitating efforts to build clearer understanding through dialogue.
Preventing Arms Races and Reducing Risks
Experts from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) advocate that the best way to reduce nuclear risks and prevent a nuclear arms race is for the United States and China to engage in serious dialogue to explore possible transparency, crisis management, and confidence-building measures. Maintaining an open path for diplomacy is crucial, despite Beijing historically rejecting such talks.
Trilateral Arms Control
The United States has called for trilateral arms control discussions involving China and Russia. While China has resisted such talks due to its smaller arsenal, some observers suggest it might become more open if it achieves nuclear parity.
Risk-Reduction Talks
The U.S. and China should engage in broad risk-reduction talks to lessen the danger of unwanted or accidental escalation. This could involve developing modern equivalents to Cold War-era agreements, such as the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Incidents at Sea agreement, potentially expanded to include other countries given China's "Grey Zone" provocations
Technological Innovations in Defense and Intelligence:
Countering Offensive Hypersonics
China's HGVs (DF-17, FOBS with HGV) are designed to maneuver at hypersonic speeds, making them better able to counter adversary missile defenses and making Chinese warheads easier to evade missile defenses.
Addressing MIRVs and Penetration Aids
China is MIRVing more of its warheads, which are much harder to defend against than single warheads, and many Chinese missiles carry penetration aids like decoys and chaff. This requires sophisticated defense and tracking capabilities.
U.S. Defense Modernization
The U.S. is responding by modernizing its own nuclear triad, upgrading F-35 aircraft, developing new gravity bombs (B-61-13), and working on a new nuclear sub-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N). Efforts also include protecting strategic systems like satellites from threats such as China's ground-based lasers, which could neutralize systems vital for the maintenance of deterrence of nuclear war.
AI and Decision-Making
While specific AI-powered counter-hypersonics are not detailed, AI as an emerging technology may precipitate the breakdown of deterrence and is linked to shrinking decision-making timelines. Intelligence gathering and analysis on AI's military applications are crucial for understanding vulnerabilities and managing rapid escalatory dynamics.
The Role of International Diplomacy and Alliances:
Strains on Non-Proliferation
China's nuclear build-up, coupled with actions by other states like Russia (e.g., suspending New START participation), is creating a proliferation moment where global nonproliferation institutions and norms appear to be fraying. This highlights the urgent need for renewed diplomatic efforts to bolster the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime.
Mitigating Proliferation Pressures
China's military expansion and territorial assertiveness are placing pressure on the nonproliferation regime by giving its neighbors, such as Japan and South Korea, increasing incentive to develop their own nuclear weaponry.
Reinforcing Extended Deterrence:
China's military build-up is generating rising doubts about the credibility of America’s nuclear umbrella or extended deterrence among Indo-Pacific allies. Diplomacy, such as through the Washington Declaration and the Nuclear Consultative Group with South Korea, is vital to reinforce extended deterrence and prevent allies from seeking their own nuclear options.
Establishing Norms for Emerging Technologies
The concern about reducing the risk of nuclear escalation stemming from AI-enabled weapons implies a need for international discussions and norms. New frameworks or diplomatic approaches might be required to manage the unique challenges posed by AI in warfare, including its impact on strategic stability and decision-making timelines.
Collective Deterrence and Stability
The potential for polycrisis or multi-front wars involving several nuclear-armed states emphasizes the need for allies to be ready to deter aggression and nuclear attacks in East Asia.
Conclusion: A Precarious Future
China's rapid and opaque nuclear expansion, coupled with its increasing regional assertiveness and a potential shift in its "no first use" policy, is fundamentally reshaping the global nuclear landscape. This build-up creates a complex "two-peer problem" for the United States and significantly heightens the risk of conventional conflicts escalating to nuclear use, while also putting immense pressure on the non-proliferation regime.
Despite these alarming trends, the number of nuclear-armed states remains limited, and the "nuclear taboo" has largely held since World War II. While China has rejected talks, the importance of diplomacy and risk-reduction talks between the U.S. and China is emphasized to reduce the danger of unwanted or accidental escalation.
As famously noted, "jaw-jaw is better than war-war". The overarching goal remains to de-escalate potential conflicts and prevent the breakdown of deterrence in an increasingly complex and multipolar nuclear landscape.
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