NATO Can’t Afford to Bet Everything on Drones
NATO can best balance traditional military strengths with emerging drone technologies for deterrence by integrating uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) to enable and enhance its existing military strengths, rather than using them to replace traditional firepower.
Here's how NATO should approach this balance:
Prioritize Enabling Traditional Firepower with UAS:
UAS should primarily be used as a means to enable artillery and aircraft to strike targets responsively and/or through active defenses.
This approach leverages NATO's existing military strengths, particularly its capability to gain and exploit air superiority through high-end airpower and multiply the power of professional armies optimized for manoeuvre warfare.
Example
Examples include using relatively affordable stand-in jammers and cheap kinetic and decoy one-way attack (OWA) drones to support Suppression/Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) operations.
These can saturate Russian air defense radars and interceptor ammunition, thereby enabling air forces or long-range artillery to successfully deliver high-end munitions like AGM-88G AARGM-ER and GMLRS to key targets without interception. Ukrainian forces have demonstrated success with similar tactics against Russian S-400 systems, and the RAF is already procuring UAS for such roles.
This strategy allows for the efficiency and scalability of direct-attack munitions such as GBU-38 JDAM or Paveway IV bombs, which are cost-effective (around $20-30,000 per bomb) and can be manufactured at scale and delivered by single jets. This is crucial for a credible deterrence by denial posture, convincing Russia that NATO can rapidly degrade and roll back Russian ground-based air defenses.
Investing in this enabling role for European air forces, supported by the land component's long-range artillery and OWA drones for suppression, poses far lower risks than heavily relying on FPV and loitering munition development to transform land forces' lethality against Russian forces already proficient in counter-UAS.
Avoid Over-Reliance on Drones as Replacements for Traditional Systems:
Russia's Formidable Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Capabilities: Russian forces possess extensive and refined C-UAS electronic warfare systems, modified infantry weapons, and short-range air defense systems, developed over three years of high-intensity combat in Ukraine.
They have adapted vehicles and fighting positions with netting, spaced bar armour, padding, and short-range jammers, and their infantry receive drone engagement training. If NATO were to replace traditional fires with massed UAS, Russian forces would find it significantly easier to mitigate UAS lethality.
Russia's Focus on C-UAS:
As Ukrainian forces have become more dependent on UAS due to shortages, Russia has increasingly focused on refining its C-UAS capabilities, leading to a rapid increase in Ukrainian drone operator casualties. A direct conflict with NATO would mean facing an even more improved Russian C-UAS capability.
Ukraine's Experience as a Cautionary Tale:
Despite being a world leader in developing, using, and innovating military UAS, and producing millions of drones, Ukraine is still taking heavy casualties and slowly losing ground to Russian assaults.
This demonstrates that massed UAS alone do not guarantee the strategic initiative or operational momentum.
While FPVs inflict steady attrition, high-end anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), anti-tank BONUS artillery rounds, and regular artillery are still more prized by Ukrainian commanders for their responsiveness and reliability against hardened targets and massing infantry when available.
Western Disadvantages in Mass Drone Production and Innovation:
Western forces are at a lower starting point than Ukraine in terms of tactical, industrial, and regulatory perspectives for rapidly scaling up UAS production and innovation under total war conditions. Western procurement and regulatory approaches are likely to be slower than Ukraine's adaptive capacity.
Essential Development of NATO's Own C-UAS Capabilities:
Rapid expansion of counter-UAS capabilities:
This is essential for European NATO members. This should be considered a theatre-entry standard for NATO armies in any Article V context, given that Russian forces already deploy more UAS than Ukraine and are rapidly innovating their combination with loitering munitions, UAV-based battlefield ISR, electronic warfare, and artillery.
What strategic risks does NATO face by over-relying on drones against Russia's counter-UAS capabilities?
Over-reliance on uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) or 'drones' by NATO, particularly in replacing traditional weapon systems, presents several significant strategic risks when facing Russia's formidable counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities.
The strategic risks NATO faces include:
Playing into Russia's Strengths: Russia currently fields the most formidable C-UAS capabilities globally, encompassing a wide range of dedicated electronic warfare (EW) systems, modified infantry weapons, and short-range air defense (SHORAD) systems integrated at all levels of their ground forces.
These capabilities have been refined over three years of high-intensity combat experience against evolving Ukrainian drone threats.
Reduced UAS Effectiveness and Decisive Damage:
Russian vehicles and fighting positions are now equipped with ubiquitous netting, spaced bar armour, padding, and short-range jammers to reduce vulnerability to FPV drones.
Russian infantry receive training on engaging drones, and military infrastructure is being hardened against long-range one-way attack (OWA) drone strikes. Consequently, only a small fraction of drones reach their targets, and an even smaller proportion achieve decisive damage.
If NATO prioritizes massed UAS at the expense of rebuilding stocks of traditional fires (like artillery, GMLRS, ATACMS, cruise missiles, and glide bombs), Russian forces would find it significantly easier to mitigate UAS lethality than they have in Ukraine.
Increased Drone Operator Casualties:
As Ukrainian forces have relied more heavily on UAS, Russian forces have focused on refining their C-UAS capabilities, leading to a rapid increase in Ukrainian drone operator casualties as Russia triangulates operator hides and targets them with artillery, glide bombs, and other UAS. NATO forces would likely face similar risks.
Lack of Strategic Initiative or Operational Momentum:
Despite Ukraine being a world leader in developing, using, and innovating with military UAS, deploying millions of drones, it is still taking heavy casualties and slowly losing ground to Russian assaults.
This demonstrates that massed UAS alone do not guarantee the ability to retain strategic initiative or operational momentum against a well-adapted adversary.
Slower Western Adaptation and Production:
Western forces start from a far lower base than Ukrainian forces in terms of tactical, industrial, and regulatory perspectives for UAS. Western procurement and the ability to rapidly scale up UAS production are likely to be slower than what Ukrainian industry has achieved under total war conditions.
Additionally, typical Western military approaches to regulation and certification of UAS in peacetime are likely to hinder rapid innovation and adaptation, lagging behind Ukraine's hard-won capacity. This makes it highly unlikely that Western forces could achieve transformative lethality or deterrent credibility against Russian forces by slowly procuring fewer drones with less practical experience.
Easier to Counter a Drone-Dependent Force:
Fundamentally, it is technically and tactically easier to counter a force that primarily relies on massed, cheap FPV and OWA drones for its primary lethality compared to countering well-employed airpower, long-range fires, armour, artillery, and mortars within a professional joint force.
Therefore, while developing counter-UAS capabilities remains essential for NATO, as Russian forces already deploy vast numbers of UAS, a heavy reliance on drones to replace traditional firepower risks playing directly into Russia's strengths and undermining NATO's military effectiveness and deterrence.
How can Western military innovation and procurement adapt to lessons from the Ukraine conflict?
While uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and one-way attack (OWA) drones have played a critical and increasingly significant role in Ukraine's defensive efforts and Russia's offensives since 2023, leading many to believe a revolution in military affairs is underway, the sources suggest that Western military innovation and procurement should adapt by not replacing traditional firepower with massed drones. Instead, the adaptation should focus on leveraging UAS to enhance existing strengths and capabilities, while significantly bolstering counter-UAS measures.
Here's how Western military innovation and procurement can adapt:
Prioritize and Rapidly Expand Counter-UAS (C-UAS) Capabilities:
Russian forces currently possess highly formidable C-UAS capabilities, including electronic warfare systems, modified infantry weapons, and short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems, refined over three years of intense combat. Russian vehicles and positions use netting, spaced bar armour, padding, and jammers to reduce vulnerability to FPV drones.
If NATO were to engage Russian forces directly, they would face an adversary that has further improved its C-UAS capabilities.
Developing NATO forces’ own C-UAS capabilities is essential and should be considered a theatre-entry standard for NATO armies.
Integrate UAS to Enable, Rather Than Replace, Traditional NATO Firepower:
The source argues that there is greater potential to deter Russia by investing in and enabling NATO's existing military strengths, such as high-end airpower for air superiority and professional armies optimized for manoeuvre warfare.
UAS are most potent when they enable artillery and aircraft to strike targets responsively or through active defenses.
Support Suppression of Enemy Air Defences (SEAD)/Destruction of Enemy Air Defences (DEAD) Operations:
Relatively affordable stand-in jammers and cheap kinetic and decoy OWA drones can be used to saturate Russian air defense radars and interceptor ammunition.
This allows high-end munitions, like AGM-88G AARGM-ER and GMLRS, to successfully reach key targets without interception. Ukrainian forces have achieved significant success using similar tactics to enable ATACMS to strike Russian S-400 systems.
The RAF is already procuring UAS for such roles through its Autonomous Collaborative Platform (ACP) programme.
Focus on Existing Strengths and Scalable Production of Conventional Munitions:
Nothing in either NATO or Ukrainian inventory can compete with the efficiency and scalability of direct-attack munitions such as GBU-38 JDAM or Paveway IV bombs once air superiority or at least access has been achieved.
These bombs are cost-effective (around $20-30,000 per unit), can destroy various targets, are easy to manufacture at scale, and multiple bombs can be delivered by a single jet per sortie.
For credible deterrence, NATO forces in Europe need to convince Russian leaders that they can rapidly degrade and roll back Russian ground-based air defenses.
A viable deterrent capability exists through an air-led Joint SEAD/DEAD campaign, supported by land components with long-range artillery and OWA drones for suppression. This approach carries lower risks than heavily investing in FPV and loitering munition development as the primary means of lethality.
It is technically and tactically easier to counter a force relying primarily on massed, cheap FPV and OWA drones than a professional joint force employing well-used airpower, long-range fires, armour, artillery, and mortars.
Acknowledge Western Limitations in UAS Production and Innovation Compared to Ukraine:
Western forces start from a significantly lower base than Ukrainian forces regarding tactical, industrial, and regulatory aspects of UAS development.
Western procurement and the ability to rapidly scale up UAS production will likely be slower than what Ukrainian industry achieved under the immense pressures of total war.
The approach to regulation and certification of UAS in most Western militaries in peacetime is likely to hinder rapid innovation and adaptation compared to the Ukrainian Armed Forces' hard-won capacity.
Ukraine, despite being a world leader in developing and using military UAS (producing millions), is still taking heavy casualties and slowly losing ground, indicating that UAS alone do not guarantee strategic initiative or operational momentum. Western forces are unlikely to achieve transformative lethality by slower procurement of similar drones with less practical experience.
How does Russia counter Ukraine's drones?
Russia counters Ukraine's drones using a highly formidable and continuously refined set of counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities. These capabilities have been developed and improved over three years of high-intensity combat experience against Ukraine's evolving drone threats.
Key methods and components of Russia's counter-drone strategy include:
Dedicated C-UAS Electronic Warfare (EW) Systems: Russia fields a wide range of dedicated EW systems specifically designed to counter drones.
Modified Infantry Weapons:
Russian forces utilize modified infantry weapons to engage drones. Russian infantry also receive training on how to engage drones as a central part of their basic training.
Short-Range Air Defense (SHORAD) Systems:
SHORAD systems are integrated at all levels of Russia's ground forces to combat drone threats.
Physical Protection and Hardening:
Vehicle and Fighting Position Protection:
Russian vehicles and fighting positions are now equipped with ubiquitous netting, spaced bar armour, padding, and short-range jammers to reduce their vulnerability to FPV (first-person view) drones.
Infrastructure Hardening:
Russian airbases and other military infrastructure are being rapidly hardened to minimize damage from frequent Ukrainian long-range one-way attack (OWA) drone strikes.
Targeting Drone Operators:
Russian forces have increasingly focused on refining their C-UAS capabilities, which includes efforts to triangulate Ukrainian drone operator hides and then rapidly target them with artillery, glide bombs, and their own uncrewed aerial systems (UAS). This has led to a rapid increase in Ukrainian drone operator casualties.
Mitigation of UAS Effectiveness: Due to these countermeasures, only a small fraction of the vast volumes of drones launched by Ukrainian forces reach their intended targets, and an even smaller proportion achieve decisive damage. Russian C-UAS countermeasures are also gaining ground and significantly constrain Ukraine's capacity to concentrate FPV and OWA effects when and where needed.
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